



The renewed Turkey-PKK conflict has shattered the illusion that
Kurds can participate legitimately in Turkey’s political system
Clashes have taken place between Turkish authorities and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), with
the violence escalating ahead of parliamentary elections scheduled for 1 November. Egemen Bezci
and Nicholas Borroz write that the renewed hostilities, following a period of relative peace between
the two sides, has undermined the notion that Kurds can legitimately participate in Turkey’s political
system. They argue that with both sides becoming polarised, the conflict could ultimately lead to the
fragmentation of the Turkish state.
The renewed clashes between Turkish authorities and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that have
taken place in recent months are reminiscent of the 1990s, when a full-scale insurgency was waged
by the PKK. During the last ten years, decreasing levels of violence had made peace seem close at
hand, but this is no longer the case. Incidents of violence are now covered on a daily basis in the
Turkish press, and some commentators have already drawn comparisons with the previous era of
conflict.
In fact, this time around, the war between the PKK and Ankara will be very different. It will likely be
more intractable, less military in nature, and may eventually lead to Turkey’s fragmentation. In terms of the new
conflict’s long-lasting nature, its seeming insolvability is now more confounding than ever. Kurds thought in the last
decade that there was a chance to participate in Turkey’s political system as a legitimate way to advance their
interests. The recent breakdown of the PKK ceasefire shatters that illusion.
Although the reasons behind Ankara’s decision to resume hostilities are contested, it is widely acknowledged that one
of the causes was Kurds’ increasing independence within the political system. Over the course of the last decade,
Kurds were granted increasing political and societal freedom by Prime Minister-turned-President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, and in return he received their electoral support.
This platform of Kurdish support was one of the factors that enabled Erdoğan to consolidate the power of his Justice
and Development Party (AKP). Since 2003 until the recent June elections, the AKP had held an absolute majority in
parliament that allowed it significant capacity to exert its political agenda. In the June election, however, the Kurds’
new political party, the Peoples’ Democratic Party  (HDP) garnered nearly six million votes, depriving the AKP of its
ability to rule with an absolute majority. For this reason, many commentators argue that the Turkish government
launched an attack on the PKK, which is widely regarded to be linked to the HDP.
Many Kurds will now be reticent to participate in a political system that they perceive will never allow them to advance
their interests. Whereas before, during the 1990s, Kurdish political representation was unimaginable, Kurds have now
had their hopes of attaining meaningful political representation raised and then dashed. This latest experiment in
allowing Kurds access to political power has failed. Many will likely seek to express their will through organisations
deemed illegitimate by the state, such as the PKK.
Another striking difference compared to the 1990s is that the PKK is now employing different strategies. The PKK
was previously based out of Turkey’s southeastern region, which is mountainous and sparsely populated. Although
Turkish military forces were able to establish tenuous daytime control of much of this region, at night, the PKK reigned
and soldiers were forced back to their barracks.
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Now, the PKK is able to launch attacks from within cities and throughout the country. In fact, its primary base is in
urban areas, primarily due to Turkey’s overall trend of urbanisation. Istanbul, for instance, is likely the Turkish city
with the largest Kurdish population. A recent PKK
attack on a police station in Istanbul, carried out during
the light of day, indicates the PKK’s increased ability to
carry out urban strikes.
This poses a greater threat to Turkish authorities than
in the 1990s, when Turks in Istanbul rarely witnessed,
and sometimes even knew very little about, the conflict
between their government and the PKK. From a purely
logistical perspective, it will be harder for the Turkish
government to combat the PKK if it is able to blend into
urban populations. The government will likely continue
to impose curfews, particularly in Kurdish towns, but
this strategy will only augment Kurds’ sense of
marginalisation.
Both the PKK and the Turkish authorities are also now focused on foreign conflicts, which will distract them from
launching large-scale attacks against each other inside of Turkey. Turkey is focused on preventing the expansion of
Kurdish zones of control in Syria, as well as combatting Islamic State, which poses a serious terrorist threat to Turkey.
The PKK, in turn, is devoting resources to helping Kurds in Syria and Iraq defend themselves against Islamic State.
In the 1990s, the PKK briefly tried to expel Turkish forces from southeastern towns, such as Semdinli and Cizre, by
using hundreds of fighters to create “liberated areas”. This time around, no such sieges will take place. Violence will
continue, to be sure, but it will comprise small-scale attacks that number dozens, not hundreds, of PKK fighters.
Shows of force will largely be symbolic, as evidenced by recent reports of PKK fighters boarding and searching
vehicles in rural areas, setting up local “courts”, and establishing security patrols.
As is often the case in guerrilla war, this fight will be about gaining popular support. Thus, the main strategy of the
PKK will be to foment divisions between the local population and the government, thereby accelerating the alienation
of the Kurdish population from the rest of the country. The HDP’s elections results, which are a proxy indicator of
popular support for the PKK, show that the group has followers throughout the country.
Ultimately, the factors described above may lead to an eventual fragmentation of the Turkish state, although this fate
is by no means certain. The HDP will likely continue its attempts to participate in legitimate political channels,
although its efforts will be severely hampered by societal divisions. Already, nationalist mobs have carried out attacks
against HDP offices throughout Turkey. The HDP’s connections to the PKK mean that party leaders will no doubt
soon begin facing legal difficulties for their ties to a “terrorist” group that is actively fighting the state.
Throughout all of this, the HDP may try to continue calling for an expansion of Kurdish rights. Buoyed by its recent
electoral success, it may potentially even call for increased regional autonomy in Turkey’s southeast. The Turkish
public, however, will have no appetite for such requests, which will feed into nationalist fears of Kurds’ secessionist
ambitions.
As nationalist rejection of Kurdish ambitions become stronger, and as the PKK weakens the state’s authority in areas
under its control, there may come a point when the Turkish house is broken, and the two sides cannot find an
agreeable situation for cohabitation. It is in this way that the resumption of violence could ultimately lead to territorial
fragmentation, albeit such an outcome would admittedly be decades away.
To avoid this fate, or at the very least to avoid years of lawlessness that seem set to ensue, both sides need to make
serious efforts at reconciliation. But such a suggestion seems doomed to fall on deaf ears, given the circumstances.
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